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Abstract
In finite games subgame perfect equilibria are precisely those that are ob-
tained by a backwards induction procedure. In large extensive form games
with perfect information this equivalence does not hold: Strategy combina-
tions fulfilling the backwards induction criterion may not be subgame perfect
in general. The full equivalence is restored only under additional (topolog-
ical) assumptions. This equivalence is in the form of a one-shot deviation
principle for large games, which requires lower semi-continuous preferences.
As corollaries we obtain one-shot deviation principles for particular classes
of games, when each player moves only finitely often or when preferences are
representable by payoff functions that are continuous at infinity.
Keywords: Backwards Induction, Subgame Perfection, Large Extensive
Form Games, Perfect Information, One-Shot Deviation Principle
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1. Introduction
Subgame perfect equilibrium is a natural solution concept for extensive
form games of perfect information (Selten, 1965, 1975). In the finite case
subgame perfect equilibria are precisely those delivered by the backwards
induction algorithm due to Kuhn (1953). The equivalence is essentially a
“one-shot deviation principle” (see, e.g., Perea, 2001, Chapter 3, or Osborne
and Rubinstein, 1994, Lemma 98.2, for the finite case, and Blackwell, 1965
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for the principle in dynamic programming). In order to check whether a
strategy combination satisfies backwards induction the algorithm starts at
the end of the tree and proceed backwards, verifying at every decision point
(node) that the player controlling it has no profitable deviation. Suppose,
however, that a player i plays at least twice, once at a given node x and once
further “down” the tree, i.e., at some other node y that comes after his or her
first decision. Backwards induction will eventually fix the player’s decision
at y, and then proceed up until the first node, x, is reached. There, the
algorithm will simply check whether player i can profitably deviate at that
node (x), taking the behavior of all players in the future, including player i
at y, as given.
In principle, such a strategy combination may satisfy backwards induction
and still fail to constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium, indeed even a Nash
equilibrium. For, a priori, even if there is no profitable deviation for i at
x, taking i’s behavior at y (and later) as given, there may still be multiple
profitable deviations, where i changes his behavior both at x and at y, and
possibly even at further nodes following y. This, of course, cannot happen
in finite games, and in that sense the equivalence of backwards induction
and subgame perfection amounts to the claim that checking for “one-shot
deviations” is enough to establish subgame perfection.
We go beyond the class of finite games and consider general extensive form
games with perfect information allowing for infinite horizon, infinite action
spaces, and even infinitely many players. Moreover, we consider ordinal
preferences rather than cardinal payoff functions. The purpose of this paper
is to show that, in general, in infinite games backwards induction may not
be equivalent to subgame perfection, but that the equivalence (in the form
of a one-shot deviation principle) holds under additional assumptions.
Somewhat surprisingly, those assumptions are topological in nature. The
one-shot deviation principle holds as long as all the players’ preferences are
lower semi-continuous; in particular, full continuity is sufficient. Of course,
this begs the question of which topology is used, and the even more primitive
question of which space is endowed with a topology. Following the original
formulation by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), we consider the space
of ultimate outcomes (on which preferences are defined) as the appropriate
primitive on which a topology is defined. This approach has the convenient
feature that all elements of the tree, e.g. the nodes, become sets of out-
comes rather than, say, abstract elements of a graph. With this approach,
the one-shot deviation principle holds for any topology which provides the
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minimal conditions necessary for players to actually be able to solve opti-
mization problems at every node, in particular that the topology is compact
and every node is a closed set of outcomes—call such topologies admissi-
ble. Of course, these conditions are trivial in the finite case for the discrete
topology (which makes every payoff function continuous), and one obtains
the standard equivalence as a straightforward corollary.
Why are topological conditions needed? Our counterexample is an infinite-
horizon game where players play infinitely often, as it is the case in e.g. in-
finitely repeated games or Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offers bargaining
game. The failure of equivalence arises from the fact that it is not possible
to identify a “last decision” for a player. If this were possible, the one-shot
deviation principle would hold without continuity assumptions. Indeed, we
show that this is precisely the case for the class of games where it is al-
ways possible to identify the last decision of a player. This class includes all
finite-horizon games independently of the cardinality of the action sets.
A second application of the main result concerns games with payoff func-
tions that are continuous at infinity (Fudenberg and Levine, 1983). We show
that the concept of continuity at infinity is equivalent to full continuity for
a particular admissible topology. Since our result only requires lower semi-
continuity (of preferences) with respect to some admissible topology, a one-
shot deviation principle for games satisfying continuity at infinity follows
directly.
The present results are conceptually related to the literature on dynamic
programming, because a dynamic optimization problem is a one-player game.
For this case the necessity of appropriate continuity assumptions is known.
Subgame perfection corresponds to the concept of policy optimality in that
literature, while backwards induction reduces to the statement that a policy
cannot be improved through a single deviation; the latter property is some-
times referred to as “unimprovability”. Blair (1984, Example 1) provides an
example showing that without what amounts to a lower semi-continuity at
infinity (his axiom A2’) a one-shot deviation principle may not hold. That
is, backwards induction for the one-player case does not imply optimality.
An example to that effect was also later provided by Streufert (1993, Section
5.2). Under A2’ (plus a weak axiom of monotonicity), however, the implica-
tion does hold (Blair, 1984, Theorem 4). Thus, for dynamic (single-player)
optimization problems it is known that lower semi-continuity is needed for
a one-shot deviation principle to hold. Our result extends this logic in two
directions: First, to subgame perfection in multi-player games and, second,
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to arbitrary (admissible) topologies. The topologies that we consider allow
greater flexibility, as will be illustrated below by an example (see Example 2).
The result on continuity at infinity is also conceptually related to the work
on consumer patience and myopia as initiated by Koopmans (1960) (see also
Brown and Lewis, 1981).
Section 2 defines extensive form games with perfect information without
finiteness assumptions and introduces the notation necessary for the analysis.
Section 3 introduces the concept of backwards induction and shows by means
of a counterexample that it does not imply subgame perfection in general.
Section 4 introduces the topological framework and proves a one-shot de-
viation principle, which establishes that subgame perfection and backwards
induction are equivalent if players’ preferences are lower-semicontinuous. Sec-
tion 5 contains the applications. Section 6 concludes.
2. Perfect Information Games
Many alternative definitions of extensive form games have been intro-
duced in the literature. Since we will ultimately speak of topological proper-
ties of preferences, and preferences are defined on ultimate outcomes of the
game, it is convenient to follow the original approach of von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944, Section 8). In that approach extensive form games are
defined on trees, but the latter are not seen as graphs. Rather, trees are
viewed as collections of (nonempty) subsets of an underlying set of outcomes
(also called plays). Although Kuhn (1953) later popularized the “graphical
approach” where trees are viewed as graphs on abstract nodes, in the orig-
inal approach by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) a node is simply a
collection of outcomes. The relation between both approaches is simple: A
node should be seen as the set of outcomes which are still available when a
player decides at that node. In that way, a node precedes another node if
and only if the latter node is properly contained in the former. Intuitively,
decisions discard possible outcomes and hence reduce the size of the nodes.
We have followed this approach in our previous work on large exten-
sive form games, in particular Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2005, henceforth
AR1), Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2008, henceforth AR2), and Alo´s-Ferrer
and Ritzberger (2013, henceforth AR3). These papers develop the concept
of a game tree, show that viewing nodes as sets of plays ordered by set inclu-
sion is without loss of generality (AR1), characterize the class of game trees
for which every pure strategy combination induces an outcome and does so
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uniquely (AR2; see also Alo´s-Ferrer et al., 2011), and characterize discrete
game trees and the associated extensive forms (AR3). In this paper, how-
ever, we need a relatively small part of the formalism, because we will deal
with games of perfect information only, and those are relatively simple.
Formally, we work with discrete game trees as introduced in AR3 (see
also Ritzberger, 2001, Definition 3.1), which are defined as follows.1
Definition 1. A discrete (rooted and complete) game tree (N,⊇) is a
collection of nonempty subsets x ∈ N (the nodes) of a given set W (of plays
or outcomes) partially ordered by set inclusion such that W ∈ N , {w} ∈ N
for all w ∈ W , and
(GT1) h ⊆ N is a chain2 if and only if there exists w ∈ W such that
w ∈ ∩x∈hx,
(GT2) every chain in the set X = N \{{w}}w∈W (of moves) has a maximum
and either an infimum in the set E = {{w}}w∈W (of terminal nodes) or a
minimum.3
Property (GT1) requires that if two nodes have a nonempty intersection
then one contains the other (“Trivial Intersection”), and that all chains have
a nonempty intersection (“Boundedness”). Property (GT2) is discreteness.
Its first part (the existence of maxima) essentially states that nodes have
immediate successors, which are the maxima of maximal chains of successors
(AR2, p. 235). This property is called “up-discreteness” and is actually nec-
essary for every pure strategy combination to induce a unique play/outcome
(AR2, Theorem 6 and Corollary 5; see also Alo´s-Ferrer et al., 2011). Its
second part (the existence of minima or infima) implies that every node
x ∈ X is reached after finitely many decisions (AR3, Theorem 1). This
property, called “down-discreteness,” is satisfied in all standard applications
and greatly simplifies the formalism, without excluding large action spaces
1 Definition 1 is equivalent to Definition 5 of AR3 plus the added property that {w} ∈ N
for all w ∈ W , which is called completeness in that work and means that (the singleton sets
made of) outcomes are included in the formalism as nodes, even if they are “reached” only
after infinitely many decisions. AR3 (Proposition 4) shows that assuming completeness is
without loss of generality.
2 A nonempty subset of a partially ordered set is called a chain if it is completely
ordered.
3 Maximum, minimum, and infimum of a chain are with respect to set inclusion. Hence-
forth ⊆ denotes weak set inclusion and ⊂ denotes proper inclusion.
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or an infinite horizon.4
For each node x ∈ N define the up-set (“the past”) ↑x and the down-set
(“the future”) ↓x by
↑x = {y ∈ N |y ⊇ x} and ↓x = {y ∈ N |x ⊇ y} . (1)
By the if-part of (GT1) ↑ x is a chain for all x ∈ N . A play is a chain of
nodes h ⊆ N that is maximal in N , i.e., there is no x ∈ N \ h such that
h∪{x} is a chain. Intuitively, a play is a complete history of all events along
the tree, from the beginning (the root W ∈ N) to the “end”—if there is an
end: Since infinite histories are allowed, plays need not be finite.
The advantage of game trees is that the set of plays can be one-to-one
identified with the underlying set W (AR1, Theorem 3(c)). That is, for
every ultimate outcome w ∈ W , the set ↑ {w} is a play, and for every play
h there exists a unique outcome w such that h =↑ {w}, or, equivalently,
∩x∈hx = {w}. Hence, abusing notation, one can identify outcomes and
plays. That is, an element w ∈ W can be seen either as a possible outcome
(element of some node) or as a play (maximal chain of nodes). Henceforth
we will not distinguish between plays and outcomes. A node can then be
identified with the set of plays passing through it, and the underlying set W
represents all plays.
For a discrete game tree (N,⊇), let (by a slight abuse of notation) W :
N ։ W denote the correspondence5 that assigns to every node, viewed as
an element of the tree, the set of its constituent plays, that is, the node itself
viewed as a set of plays, i.e. W (x) = x for all x ∈ N . For a set Y ⊆ N of
nodes write W (Y ) = ∪x∈Y x ⊆ W for the union, and refer to W (Y ) as the
plays passing through Y .
In an extensive form game every node that has proper successors corre-
sponds to a decision point where some player is active. In contrast, nodes
(if any) “at the end” of the tree do not capture decisions. Formally, for a
discrete game tree (N,⊇) a node x ∈ N is terminal if ↓x = {x}. A node is
a move if it is not terminal. It can be shown (see AR2, Lemma 1, and AR3,
Lemma 3(b)) that a node x ∈ N in a discrete game tree is terminal if and
only if there is w ∈ W such that x = {w}. Hence the set E = {{w}}w∈W
4 (GT2) excludes e.g. games in continuous time.
5 Even though the same symbol serves for the map and its range, no confusion can
arise, because the argument will always be specified.
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introduced in (GT2) coincides with the set of terminal nodes. Likewise, the
set X = N \ E is the set of moves.
A more fundamental classification of nodes in a discrete game tree is as
follows. Say that x ∈ N \{W} is finite if ↑x\{x} has a minimum and infinite
if x = inf ↑ x \ {x}. By AR3 (Proposition 3) in a discrete game tree every
node is either finite or infinite. Intuitively, a node is finite if it is reached
after finitely many decisions, while infinite nodes are those which are only
reached “in the limit,” e.g., in the case of infinite horizon games. Again by
Proposition 3 of AR3 all infinite nodes are terminal. Denote by F (N) the
set of finite nodes together with the root W ∈ N . On this set a function
p : F (N)→ X can be defined that assigns to every finite node its immediate
predecessor. Namely, for each x ∈ F (N) \ {W} let
p (x) = min ↑x \ {x} (2)
and p (W ) = W by convention. Hence, x ⊂ p (x) = ∩{y |y ∈↑x \ {x}} for
all x ∈ F (N) \ {W}.
In order to define general extensive form games, one needs the concept
of choices and the derived concept of information sets. That framework has
been developed in AR1 and AR2, and specialized to discrete trees in AR3.
However, in this work we deal with perfect information games only, and
hence a game will be fully characterized by the tree, the set of players, their
decision points, and their preferences on W .
Definition 2. An extensive form game with perfect information
(EFPI) is a tuple (T, I,X ,-), where T = (N,⊇) is a discrete game tree,
I is the (possibly infinite) set of players, X = (Xi)i∈I is a partition of the set
of moves X of the tree T into the sets of decision points for players i ∈ I, and
-= (-i)i∈I is a profile of reflexive, complete, and transitive binary relations
on the set W of plays, one preference relation for each player i ∈ I.
In an EFPI, at every move x ∈ X , the player for whom x ∈ Xi makes a
decision and selects an immediate successor6 y ∈ p−1(x). Moves of nature are
ruled out. In the present setting this is natural, because in games of perfect
6 A node y is an immediate succesor of x if and only if x is the immediate predecessor
of y. The set of immediate successors of y is hence given by p−1(x) = {y ∈ N | x = p(y)}.
Note that immediate successors might include terminal nodes.
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information with chance moves SPE may not exist (Luttmer and Mariotti,
2003).
A pure strategy for player i ∈ I in an EFPI (T, I,X ,-) is a function
si : Xi → N such that p(si(x)) = x for all x ∈ Xi, i.e., a function that
specifies which of the immediate successors of each x ∈ Xi is chosen by
player i. The set Si of all such functions is player i’s pure strategy space.
A (pure) strategy combination is a tuple s = (si)i∈I ∈ S ≡ ×i∈I Si of pure
strategies, one for each player.
A subgame of an EFPI as above is the perfect information game that
starts at some move x ∈ X . Under perfect information every move x ∈ X
is the root of a subgame. For every x ∈ X there is a function φx : S → x
which assigns to the subgame starting at x ∈ X the play φx (s) ∈ x that the
strategy combination s ∈ S (uniquely) induces in the subgame starting at
x. Formally this follows from AR3, Theorem 3, and AR2, Theorems 2 and
6, and Corollary 5. This translates preferences on plays into preferences on
strategy combinations.
A (pure) Nash equilibrium is a pure strategy combination s ∈ S such
that no player has an incentive to deviate from it. A (pure) subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE; Selten, 1965) is a pure strategy combination s ∈ S =
×i∈I Si that induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
3. Backwards induction
In the finite case an SPE is a backwards induction equilibrium obtained
by pasting together solutions of subgames. In the infinite case we first need to
formalize the notion of backwards induction without reference to an endpoint.
First, for a fixed move x ∈ X in a discrete game tree (N,⊇) define the
immediate successor that contains a particular play w ∈ x by
γ (x, w) = ∪{y ∈ N |w ∈ y ⊂ x} . (3)
That γ (x, w) is indeed a node in p−1(x) follows from the first part of (GT2).
Call a function f : N → W that satisfies f (x) ∈ x for all x ∈ N a
selection and let F denote the set of all selections. Then, combining the
functions φx for all x ∈ X , a strategy combination s ∈ S uniquely defines
a selection fs ∈ F by fs (x) = φx (s) for all x ∈ X and fs ({w}) = w for
all w ∈ W . Call this fs the selection induced by s ∈ S . Conversely, in an
EFPI every selection f ∈ F uniquely defines a strategy combination s ∈ S
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by si (x) = γ (x, f (x)) for all x ∈ Xi and all i ∈ I. In particular, fs yields
the strategy combination s.
Definition 3. For an EFPI (T, I,X ,-), a strategy combination s ∈ S sat-
isfies backwards induction if the induced selection fs ∈ F is such that,
for all players i ∈ I and all x ∈ Xi,
(BI1) if fs (p (x)) ∈ x then fs (x) = fs (p (x)), and
(BI2) fs (y) -i fs (x) for all y ∈ p
−1 (x).
Property (BI1) states that a player at move p (x) correctly foresees the
decisions at the successor x and thereafter, i.e., every player holds the cor-
rect expectations about all future decisions, including those of other players.
(BI2) is states that every individual choice of every player is optimal. These
two properties clearly have to hold in every SPE.
Proposition 1. Every SPE of an EFPI satisfies backwards induction.
Proof. If (BI2) fails, then fs ∈ F cannot be the selection induced by an SPE,
because then some player i has a profitable deviation at some node x ∈ Xi.
If (BI1) fails, then the player i who controls the immediate predecessor p(x)
of x expects the play to continue differently than the player j who decides
at x, which can also not be the case in an SPE.
In a finite game the converse of this result would also hold. In an infinite
game, though, a strategy combination may satisfy backwards induction, but
not subgame perfection, as the following example illustrates.
Example 1. Let W = {1, 2, ...,∞} be the set of natural numbers, ordered
by the standard relation ≥, together with an additional element denoted ∞,





, where xw = {w
′ ∈ W |w′ ≥ w} for all w ∈ W ,
which is easily seen to form a discrete game tree (an “infinite centipede”).
Consider two players, I = {1, 2}, and let X1 = {xw ∈ X |w is odd} and X2 =
{xw ∈ X |w is even}. Preferences are represented by the payoff functions
ui (w) = (−1)
w /w for all w = 1, 2, ... and ui (∞) = 1 for i = 1, 2. See Figure
1 for a graphical representation.
Consider a strategy combination s ∈ S such that player 1 always “con-
tinues” (chooses xw+1 at any xw ∈ X1) and player 2 always “stops” (chooses

















Figure 1: Graphical representation of Example 1. Player 1 plays at odd-numbered moves,
player 2 at even-numbered ones. Both players have the same payoffs. The dotted-lines pro-
file where player 1 always continues and player 2 always stops fulfills backwards induction
but is not subgame-perfect.
fs ∈ F given by
fs (x) =
{
w + 1 if x = xw ∈ X and w is odd
w if x = xw ∈ X and w is even or x = {w}
which satisfies backwards induction, but is not an SPE. To see that (BI1) in
the definition of backwards induction holds, let x ∈ Xi for some i ∈ I and
suppose fs (p (x)) ∈ x. By definition of fs, it follows that p (x) = xw with
w odd, so that fs (x) = fs (xw+1) = w + 1 = fs (p (x)). Therefore, condition
(BI1) holds. To see (BI2), let first x = xw ∈ X for w odd. Then x ∈ X1 and
u1 (fs (xw)) = u1 (w + 1) =
1
w + 1




If, on the other hand, x = xw ∈ X for w even, then x ∈ X2 and
u2 (fs (xw)) = u2 (w) =
1
w




Since this completes the verification of (BI2), backwards induction holds.
The resulting payoffs are (1/2, 1/2). But if player 2 deviates to “always
continue” (choosing xw+1 at each xw ∈ X2), she obtains u2 (∞) = 1, showing
that the deviation is profitable. Hence, s ∈ S is not an SPE.
In this example backwards induction fails to detect the profitable devi-
ation of player 2, because the deviation is, in a sense, “infinite.” That 2’s
infinite deviation is profitable, even though 2 has no profitable finite devia-
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tion, is due to a failure of lower semi-continuity of preferences.
To gain intuition on this point, consider the natural topology in this case.
Note that W as defined is just the set of Alexandroff-compactified natural
numbers. Take the corresponding topology, i.e. the Alexandroff compactifica-
tion based on the discrete topology of the natural numbers.7 Then (W, τ) is a
well-behaved topological space, e.g. it is compact and separated (Hausdorff)8
and all nodes are closed sets.
Payoffs in the example above are easily seen to be upper semi-continuous,
but they are not lower semi-continuous and “jump upwards” at ∞.9
4. A General One-Shot Deviation Principle
For finite games with perfect information a one-shot deviation princi-
ple holds that backwards induction is equivalent to subgame perfection.10
The last example shows that, without further assumptions, this is incorrect
for large extensive form games. That is, in general backwards induction
is necessary, but not sufficient for an SPE. Our main result will show that
the one-shot deviation principle in infinite games takes lower semi-continuous
preferences. This, however, requires us to clarify what is an acceptable topol-
ogy for an extensive form game.
Definition 4. Given a discrete game tree T = (N,⊇) with set of plays W ,
a topology τ on W is T -admissible if W is compact in τ and x is closed for
every node x ∈ N .
Since closed subsets of compact sets are compact, an admissible topology
is one where all nodes are compact. Intuitively, if some node were not com-
pact, it would be easy to specify profiles of continuous preferences such that
7 The Alexandroff compactification of a topological space adds the element ∞ to the
space and defines the topology on the space to consist of the open sets of the original
space together with all subsets that contain ∞ and are such that their complements (in
the original space) are closed and compact (Kelley, 1975, p. 150).
8 A topological space is Hausdorff or separated if any two distinct points can be sepa-
rated by disjoint neighborhoods.
9 A real valued function f : W → R is upper resp. lower semi-continuous if for each
r ∈ R the upper resp. lower contour set {w ∈ W |f (w) ≥ r} resp. {w ∈W |f (w) ≤ r } is
closed.
10 Hendon et al. (1996) and Perea (2002) consider one-shot deviation principles for finite
games with imperfect information.
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the player active at that node would not be able to maximize, and hence SPE
would not exist in general. The definition above is actually weaker than the
conditions necessary to guarantee existence of SPE for continuous preferences
(for details, see Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016 and forthcoming).
The following lemma is needed to establish our main result. It states
that, given a T -admissible topology and an open neighborhood of a play
w ∈ W , there exists a finite node containing w which is fully contained in
the neighborhood.
Lemma 1. Let T = (N,⊇) be a discrete game tree with set W of plays and τ
a T -admissible topology on W . If w ∈ u ∈ τ , then there is x ∈↑{w} ∩F (N)
such that x ⊆ u.
Proof. Let w ∈ u ∈ τ . If {w} ∈ F (N), there is nothing to prove. Otherwise,
because the tree is discrete, it follows that {w} ∈ E is an infinite node. Then
by Lemma 2 of AR2
⋂
{y | y ∈↑{w} \ {{w}}} = {w}. If there is no y such
that {w} ⊂ y ⊆ u, then for every y ∈↑{w} \ {{w}} there is wy ∈ y \ u. The
set {wy ∈ W \ u |y ∈↑{w} \ {{w}}}, where the set of indices is ordered by
y ≤ z ⇔ z ⊆ y, forms a sequence (by discreteness, Theorem 1(d) of AR3)
in W \ u. Since W \ u is closed, hence, compact, this sequence contains a
subsequence that converges to some w′ ∈ W\u. Since ↑{w}\{{w}} is a chain,
this subsequence is eventually contained in every y ∈↑{w}\{{w}}. Hence w′
is a cluster point of every such node y. Since nodes are closed by hypothesis,
w′ ∈ y for all y ∈↑{w}\ {{w}}. But then w′ ∈
⋂
{y | y ∈↑{w} \ {{w}}} =
{w} implies w′ = w, in contradiction to w′ ∈ W \ u and w ∈ u. Hence, there
is x ∈↑{w} \ {{w}} ⊆ F (N), the latter by Theorem 1(b) of AR3, such that
x ⊆ u. This completes the proof.
With this auxiliary step at hand we are now able to prove the main result.
Theorem 1. Let (T, I,X ,-) be an EFPI on a discrete game tree T = (N,⊇)
with set W of plays and τ a T -admissible topology onW . If -i is lower semi-
continuous with respect to τ for all i ∈ I,11 then a strategy combination s ∈ S
constitutes an SPE if and only if s ∈ S satisfies backwards induction.
11 A binary relation - on W is upper resp. lower semi-continuous if for each w ∈ W
the upper resp. lower contour set {w′ ∈ W |w - w′ } resp. {w′ ∈ W |w′ - w } is closed in
τ .
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Proof. By Proposition 1 it is enough to show the if part. Let s ∈ S satisfy
backwards induction and let f ∈ F be the selection induced by s. Hence,
si (x) = γ (x, f (x)) for all x ∈ Xi and all i ∈ I.
If s ∈ S is not an SPE, then there is some player i ∈ I and a move
x ∈ Xi for which there exists a function g :↓ x → x such that g (y) ∈ y,
g (p (y)) ∈ y ⇒ g (y) = g (p (y)), and y /∈ Xi ⇒ γ(y, g (y)) = γ(y, f (y)) for
all y ∈↓x, and f (x) ≺i g (x). The function g captures the deviation of player
i in the subgame starting at x. The play induced by this deviation in the
subgame is g(x).
Consider first the case where player i deviates only finitely often along
the play g(x), i.e., there are only finitely many y ∈ Xi∩ ↓ x∩ ↑ {g(x)}
such that γ(y, g(y)) 6= γ(y, f(y)). Let y0 be the minimum of this chain,
i.e., the last deviation by player i along the play g(x). Note that, for every
z ∈ Xi∩ ↓ x∩ ↑ {g(x)}, the play g(z) coincides with the play g(x). By
(BI2) f(y0) %i f(γ(y0, g(x))) = g(x). Let y1 be the minimum of the set of
y ∈ Xi∩ ↓x∩ (↑y0 \ {y0}) such that γ(y, g(y)) 6= γ(y, f(y)); that is, y1 is the
last deviation of player i before y0. For nodes z such that y0 ⊂ z ⊂ y1 the
active player at z does not deviate from the original profile. This implies that
for all these nodes f(z) = f(y0), applying (BI1) inductively. It now follows,
again from (BI2), that f(y1) %i f(γ(y1, g(x))) = f(y0) %i g(x). Proceeding
inductively, it follows that f(x) %i g(x), contradicting f(x) ≺i g(x).
Next, consider the case where player i deviates infinitely often along the
play g(x), i.e. there are infinitely many y ∈ Xi∩ ↓ x∩ ↑ {g(x)} such that
γ(y, g(y)) 6= γ(y, f(y)). We claim that then there is another profitable devi-
ation that deviates from f only at a finite chain of moves—which will then
lead to a contradiction.
Because -i is lower semi-continuous on W , the strict upper contour set
{w ∈ x |f (x) ≺i w} is open and g (x) ∈ W belongs to it. By Lemma 1 there
is y′ ∈↑ {g (x)} ∩ F (N) such that y′ ⊆ {w ∈ x |f (x) ≺i w}. Therefore,
f (x) ≺i f (z) for all z ∈↓ y
′. Since player i deviates infinitely often along
g(x), there exists y ∈ F (N) with y ∈ Xi∩ ↓ y
′∩ ↑ {g(x)} such that y ⊆
{w ∈ x |f (x) ≺i w}.
Let w∗ = f(γ(y, g(y))) and define the function g′ :↓x→ x by
g′ (z) =
{
w∗ if z ∈↓x∩ ↑y
f (z) otherwise
Note that γ(z, g′(z)) = γ(z, f(z)) for any player j 6= i and all z ∈ Xj. This
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is because for any move of player j before y the successor that contains w∗
coincides with the one that contains g(x).
Because the tree is discrete and y ∈ F (N), the chain ↓ x∩ ↑ y is finite
(AR3, Theorem 1(c)), thus, g′ deviates from f only at finitely many moves.
That ↓x∩ ↑y is a chain and the definition of w∗ imply that (BI1) holds. Since
w∗ ∈ y, it follows that w∗ ∈ {w ∈ x |f (x) ≺i w}. Therefore, g
′ describes
a finite and profitable deviation after x, which according to the previous
argument cannot exist. This completes the proof.
It is important to realize that Theorem 1 applies for any T -admissible
topology. Topological approaches to infinite horizon games have often relied
on a product construction, where the set of actions at each step is assumed
to be compact and compactness of the space of plays is then derived from
Tychonoff’s theorem (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 1983; Harris, 1985; Hellwig
and Leininger, 1987). This imposes a particular choice of topology, which
Theorem 1 does not rely on. The following example illustrates that the
freedom to choose a natural topology can be advantageous.
Example 2. Consider the following two-player, infinite-horizon game. The
outcome of the game is a real number w ∈ [0, 1], to be determined jointly by
two players in an iterative fashion. In period 1 player 1 can either choose some
w ∈ [0, 1/2) (in which case the game ends), or pass the decision to player 2.
In the latter case in period 2 player 2 can either choose some w ∈ [1/2, 3/4)
(in which case the game ends), or return the decision to player 1, and so
on. That is, player 1 moves at odd periods t = 1, 3, 5, . . ., and player 2 at
even periods, t = 2, 4, 6, . . . Let qt = 1 −
1
2t
, t = 0, 1, . . ., and It = [qt−1, qt),
t = 1, 2, . . . At period t, the player who moves can either fix some w ∈ It,
in which case the game ends with that choice of w, or pass the decision to
the other player. If no player ever picks a number, the outcome is w = 1.
Payoffs are functions ui : [0, 1]→ R, for i = 1, 2.
Our modeling approach for this game is simple. The natural set of plays is
obviously W = [0, 1], and the most natural choice of topology is the relative
Euclidean topology on this interval. The tree is formed by all singleton nodes
{w}, w ∈ W , and the “continue” nodes xt = [qt, 1] for t ≥ 0. At period t, the
active player decides at move xt−1 and can choose among the successors {w},
with qt−1 ≤ w < qt, and the “continue” successor xt. Since W is compact
and all nodes are closed, the relative Euclidean topology is T -admissible.
In contrast, the product construction would go as follows. At period t, let
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of player 1’s payoff in Example 2. Horizontal scale is
stretched to increase visibility.
Hence At is compact in the relative Euclidean topology and the product set
A = ×∞t=1At is compact. As noted elsewhere (Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger,
2016 and forthcoming), the Tychonoff construction blows up the space of
plays, in this case generating an infinite-dimensional space even though the
set of outcomes is simply a compact interval of real numbers.
Let us complete the description of the game by specifying payoffs. For
simplicity, let u2 be constant, u2(w) = k for all w ∈ [0, 1]. The payoff
function for player 1 will be specified in a piecewise way as follows. For each





(w − qt−1) for all w ∈ It.
Note that u1(qt−1) = 0 and limw→qt− u1(qt) = qt for all t ≥ 1. Further, set
u1(1) = 0. Figure 2 represents this payoff function.
Consider any payoff pi with 0 ≤ pi < 1. For each t ≥ 0, there exists
a unique wt(pi) ∈ [qt−1, qt] such that, for w ∈ It, u1(w) > pi if and only if
w ∈ (wt(pi), qt). Further, the interval (wt(pi), qt) can be empty (wt(pi) = qt)
only for finitely many values of t. That is, the strict upper contour set for
payoff pi is given by




which is open in the relative Euclidean topology. Further, U1(1) = ∅. Hence,
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the payoff function u1 : [0, 1] → R is lower semi-continuous in the relative
Euclidean topology, and, since the constant function u2 is also lower semicon-
tinuous, Theorem 1 applies and every strategy profile satisfying backwards
induction is a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
This game has many SPE. Consider a strategy profile as follows. Player
1 always continues, i.e. s1(xt) = xt+1 for all t ≥ 0. For each t = 2, 4, . . .,
choose any wt such that u1(wt) > qt−1 (recall Figure 2). Let player 2 stop
and choose one such wt at period t, i.e., s2(xt) = wt. Player 2’s choice is
always optimal since u2 is constant. Player 1’s choice to continue is always
optimal, since player 2 “promises” him a strictly larger payoff in the following
period than the supremum of the payoffs he can obtain by stopping. Hence
backwards induction holds, and the profile is an SPE by Theorem 1. Other,
qualitatively different SPE exist, for instance where player 2 also continues
for finitely many periods and then behaves as described above.12
Analyzing this simple example with the Tychonoff construction gives rise
to a number of difficulties. First, the payoff function u1 is not lower semi-
continuous. To see this, recall that numbers w ∈ [0, 1] giving a strictly larger
payoff than pi ∈ [0, 1) are those in
⋃∞
t=1(wt(pi), qt). If plays are taken to be
elements of the infinite product A =×∞t=1[qt−1, qt], essentially the strict up-
per contour set would map into the product set ×∞t=1(wt(pi), qt) (see below
for the precise argument). But this is not an open set in the product topol-
ogy. Any open set has to contain a basic open neighborhood of each of its
points, where basic open neighborhoods are product sets such that finitely
many coordinates are open subsets of the coordinate (action) spaces, but the
remaining infinitely many coordinates are “unrestricted”, i.e., they contain
the whole coordinate space. It follows that, for the strict upper contour set
to be open, we would need to have that [qt−1, qt] = (wt(pi), qt) for all but
finitely many coordinates, a contradiction.
The precise argument showing that u1 is not lower semi-continuous is
slightly more involved, due to the technicalities involved in the product ap-
proach. Specifically, the function u1 is not defined on the full product spaceA,
because this space is far too large. Rather, as observed e.g. by Harris (1985),
one needs to reconstruct the set of plays as a strict subset of A. (For the
12 Hence the two-player game has infinitely many SPE. It is interesting to note that, if
the example is recast as a one-player game (with player 1 making all choices), there exist
no subgame perfect equilibrium. The example then becomes a continuous-action version
of “Denardo’s counterexample” as reported in Sobel (1975, Example 4).
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analysis to be fruitful the set of plays also needs to be a closed subset of the
product set, but we will ignore this added difficulty here; for details, see Alo´s-
Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016 and forthcoming.) In the present case the set of
plays can be represented as a subset of the product space by recalling the
convention that “continuing” corresponds to the choice qt ∈ At = [qt−1, qt].
A play where players continue for t − 1 periods and then stop by choosing
the number wt ∈ It at period t can be represented by the infinite sequence










∣∣ wt ∈ At, wr = qr ∀r 6= t} .









∣∣ wt ∈ (wt(pi), qt), wr = qr ∀r 6= t} .
If B were open in the relative topology on H inherited from the product
topology, there would be a basic open set of the product topology whose
intersection with H would be contained in B. This would imply (wt(pi), qt) =
At for all but finitely many t, a contradiction. Hence, u1 is not lower semi-
continuous if one insists on the product topology. And Theorem 1 does not
apply, simply because the “wrong” topology has been selected.
5. Applications
In this section we apply Theorem 1 to particular classes of games. The
first class concerns games where players decide only finitely often along each
play. The second allows players to decide infinitely often along a play, but
assumes finitely many actions at each move and representable preferences.
5.1. Games Where Players Move Finitely Often
Consider the case of finite games. The set of outcomes, W , is finite,
and one can simply take the discrete topology on W , which is trivially T -
admissible. All payoff functions are automatically continuous in this topol-
ogy, and the standard equivalence between backwards induction and subgame
perfection follows as a trivial corollary of Theorem 1.
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Corollary 1. In finite extensive form games with perfect information a strat-
egy combination constitutes an SPE if and only if it satisfies backwards in-
duction.
In the infinite case, however, the discrete topology will in general not be
T -admissible, e.g. by virtue of failing compactness. In Example 1 the set W
of plays is not compact in the discrete topology. It follows from Theorem
1 that in this example there exist no T -admissible topology such that the
payoff functions are lower semi-continuous.
There are classes of games where the equivalence can be established with-
out explicit reference to a topology. One such class is obtained as follows.
Given an EFPI, a player i plays finitely often if for every play w, viewed as
a maximal chain of nodes ↑{w}, i decides only finitely often along the play,
i.e. ↑{w} ∩Xi is finite for all plays w ∈ W .
The class of extensive form games where all players play finitely often
includes many applications. For instance, in every finite-horizon game, all
plays are finite, and hence every player can play only finitely often. A dif-
ferent subclass is the one where every player has only finitely many moves,
i.e. Xi is finite for each i ∈ I. For instance, games with infinite horizon and
infinitely many players where each player only has finitely many decisions
belong to this category.13
The following result shows that the one-deviation principle holds for this
class of games without topological assumptions. The key is that the proof of
Theorem 1 does not rely on continuity if it is always possible to identify a
last decision for every player along any play.
Corollary 2. Let (T, I,X ,-) be an EFPI on a discrete game tree T = (N,⊇)
with set W of plays such that every player plays finitely often. Then, a
strategy combination constitutes an SPE if and only if it satisfies backwards
induction.
Proof. Let s ∈ S satisfy backwards induction. Proceeding as in the proof
of Theorem 1, there is a player i ∈ I who can profitably deviate in the
13 This does not mean that all games in this class are such that every player is active at
finitely many moves only. Consider, for example, the classical Stackelberg duopoly (von
Stackelberg, 1934). The game has a finite horizon and hence every player plays finitely
often. However, the follower has a continuum of moves (one for each possible production
decision of the leader).
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subgame starting at some move x ∈ Xi. Since every player plays finitely
often, it follows that i deviates only finitely often along the play induced by
the deviation. The proof of Theorem 1 in that case reaches a contradiction
without using any topological assumption.
5.2. Continuity at Infinity
Previous results beyond the finite case relied on a notion of “continu-
ity at infinity,” introduced by Fudenberg and Levine (1983). For instance,
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Theorem 4.2) use it to prove a one-stage devi-
ation principle for infinite horizon multi-stage games with observed actions.
Hendon et al. (1996, p. 281) also rely on this condition to prove a one-shot
deviation principle for games with finite information sets and finite choice
sets at each information set, but for an infinite horizon. For the case of
perfect information this implies that backwards induction is equivalent to
subgame perfection in this particular setting.14
Here we will show that the concept of continuity at infinity coincides with
full continuity in a particular T -admissible topology. The insight from that
is that the assumptions of Theorem 1 are strictly weaker than continuity
at infinity. Hence, Theorem 1 will imply a one-shot deviation principle for
games with payoff functions that are continuous at infinity.
We first construct the appropriate topology and demonstrate that it is
T -admissible. Suppose that at every move only finitely many options are
available, that is, p−1 (x) is finite for each x ∈ X . For t ≥ 0 let Yt be the
set of nodes which can be reached after t steps from the root, that is, x ∈ Yt
if and only if ↑x contains exactly t + 1 nodes. Let At be the set containing
all possible options available at moves in Yt plus a dummy option ∗, that is,
At = (∪x∈Ytp
−1 (x))∪{∗}. The set of plays W can be identified with a subset
of the product space ×t≥0At. For instance, a finite play would correspond
to an infinite sequence where all entries after some finite t are the dummy
option ∗.
Endow each At with the discrete topology. Then A = ×t≥0At can be
endowed with the product topology and W inherits the relative topology.
14Sobel (1975) assumes “countable transitivity”, which amounts to an upper semi-
continuity at infinity. Blair (1984) shows that what is needed for a one-shot deviation
principle to hold for one-player settings is the “dual” of this assumption, that is, a lower
semi-continuity at infinity.
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Call this topology the product-discrete topology on plays. This topology is
T -admissible, that is, it is compact and all nodes are closed sets.
Lemma 2. Consider an EFPI on a discrete game tree T such that every move
has finitely many immediate successors. Then the product-discrete topology
on plays is T -admissible.
Proof. For a given sequence a ∈ A and a number k define













This set is open in the product topology on A, because each {a(t)} is open in
the discrete topology on At and only finitely many coordinates are restricted.
The set V (a, k) is also closed (i.e., it is clopen) in the product topology,
because it is a product of closed sets.
Now, notice that each At is compact by virtue of being finite, hence by
Tychonoff’s Theorem A is compact with the product topology. We now show
that W is a closed subset of A, hence compact with the relative topology.
Equivalently we show that A \W is open. Let a be a sequence in A \W .
This is the case if and only if some coordinate a(t) is followed by a coordinate
a(t+1) which is incompatible with the tree, that is, one of the following three
conditions holds: either (i) a(t) ∈ X but a(t + 1) /∈ p−1(a(t)), (ii) a(t) is a
terminal node but a(t + 1) 6= ∗, or (iii) a(t) = ∗ but a(t + 1) 6= ∗. Let k
be the first index at which one of the three violations occurs. In all three
cases the open set V (a, k + 1) contains a and is contained in A \W . That
is, every point in A \W has an open neighborhood contained in A \W . It
follows that A \W is open, therefore W is closed, hence compact.
Furthermore, every node, identified with the corresponding set of plays
in W ⊆ A, is closed. To see this, notice that a node is the intersection of W
with a set of the form V (a, k) for some a ∈ A and some fixed k. As observed
above, the latter set is closed in the product topology of A. Hence, the node
is closed in the product-discrete topology on plays.
To define continuity at infinity requires representable preferences. Hence,
assume that for each players i ∈ I there is a payoff function ui that repre-
sents i’s preferences. Then, a game is continuous at infinity (Fudenberg and
Levine, 1983) if for each ε > 0 there is a K such that whenever s, s′ ∈ S
are identical on all Yt for any t ≤ K, then |ui (φ (s))− ui (φ (s
′))| < ε, for all
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i ∈ I. Since the payoffs only depend on the induced play φ (s), this defini-
tion can be stated equivalently on plays. That is, the game is continuous at
infinity if for each ε > 0 there is a K such that whenever w,w′ ∈ W coincide
up to K, then |ui (w)− ui (w
′)| < ε, for all i ∈ I.15
It follows from Theorem 1 that backwards induction and subgame per-
fection are equivalent whenever the preferences represented by the payoff
functions ui are lower semi-continuous with respect to some T -admissible
topology. Continuity at infinity is a stronger criterion, though. It is equiva-
lent to full continuity with respect to the product-discrete topology on plays.
Lemma 3. Consider an EFPI on a discrete game tree T such that every move
has finitely many immediate successors and preferences are representable by
payoff functions. It satisfies continuity at infinity if and only if payoff func-
tions are continuous with resepct to the product-discrete topology on plays.
Proof. “if:” Let ε > 0 and w ∈ W . By continuity of ui in the product-
discrete topology the preimage u−1i ((ui(w)− ε, ui(w) + ε)) is open. By def-
inition of the product-discrete topology there exists a t(w, ε) such that w ∈
V (w, t(w, ε)) ⊆ u−1i ((ui(w)− ε, ui(w) + ε)) for V (w, t(w, ε)) as in (4). That
is, |ui(w
′)− ui(w)| < ε for every w
′ ∈ W that coincides with w until t(w, ε).
However, continuity at infinity entails a uniformity in the sense that t(w, ε)
has to be independent of w (see also Fudenberg and Levine, 1983, Lemma
3.1). To show this, we use the fact that W is compact by Lemma 2.
Fix ε > 0. The collection of sets V (w, t(w, ε/2)) ∩ W for all w ∈ W
form an open covering of W . By compactness there is a finite subcovering
with indices w1, . . . , wL for some finite L. Let t¯ = maxℓ=1,...,L t (wℓ, ε/2)
and w,w′ ∈ W be such that they coincide up to t¯. There is a wℓ such
that w ∈ V (wℓ, t (wℓ, ε/2)). Hence w and wℓ coincide up to t (wℓ, ε/2). By
the previous observation this implies that |ui(wℓ)− ui(w)| < ε/2. Since
w and w′ coincide up to t¯ ≥ t (wℓ, ε/2), it follows that w
′ also coincides
with wℓ up to t (wℓ, ε/2). Hence, |ui(wℓ)− ui(w
′)| < ε/2. We conclude
that |ui(w
′)− ui(w)| ≤ |ui(wℓ)− ui(w)|+ |ui(wℓ)− ui(w
′)| < ε. This proves
continuity at infinity.
“only if:” Let (b0, b1) be an open interval of real numbers and let w ∈ W
be such that ui (w) lies in this interval. By continuity at infinity there is a
15 The equivalence requires the fact that for every play there is a strategy combination
that induces it, see Theorem 4 of AR2.
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t ≥ 0 and a set V (w, t) (as in (4)), which is open in the product-discrete
topology on A, that contains w and such that every play in this set yields a
payoff in (b0, b1). This shows that u
−1
i ((b0, b1)) is open. It follows that ui is
continuous in the product-discrete topology on plays.
Putting together the last two lemmata with Theorem 1 we obtain the
following result.
Proposition 2. In any extensive form game of perfect information where
players have finitely many options available at every move and payoff func-
tions are continuous at infinity, a strategy combination constitutes an SPE
if and only if it satisfies backwards induction.
The discussion above shows that Theorem 1 is strictly stronger than re-
sults based on continuity at infinity, because it relies on weaker assumptions.
First, it relies on lower semi-continuity rather than on full continuity. Sec-
ond, continuity can be with respect to any (admissible) topology, rather than
a particular one based on a product structure. Third, our result relies on or-
dinal preferences only, not on cardinal payoff functions.
6. Conclusion
The main message of this paper is that, for infinite games, the equiva-
lence between backwards induction and subgame perfection can be seen as
a topological property. Backwards induction guarantees subgame perfection
as long as the preference relations are lower semi-continuous. In particular,
continuity always suffices to establish the equivalence. Continuity, however,
is a topological property, and hence in order to be able to state the equiva-
lence, one needs to specify the topology in advance. This is hardly too much
to ask for in game theory, since most equilibrium existence theorems rely
on continuity and compactness anyway. It makes explicit, however, that the
choice of topology is not inconsequential.
In particular, we have assumed topologies such that every node is closed.
In two related papers (Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016 and forthcoming) we
provide a characterization of the class of (compact) topologies such that every
perfect information game with continuous preferences has a subgame perfect
equilibrium (for a given discrete game tree). This characterization implies
that all nodes are closed in the topology. Hence, this requirement is actu-
ally necessary for conducting equilibrium analysis in extensive form games.
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Therefore, our assumption in Theorem 1 that topologies are T -admissible is
a rather weak one.
Corollary 2, however, clarifies when topological assumptions are actually
needed. If every players plays only finitely often, as is always the case in
finite-horizon games, the one-shot deviation principle always holds without
any reference to payoff continuity. The topological framework is hence needed
when at least some players may play infinitely often along some plays. That
class, however, includes many interesting examples, from infinitely repeated
games and examples as e.g. alternating-offers bargaining (Rubinstein, 1982),
all the way to games with one long-run player and infinitely many short-run
players (Fudenberg and Levine, 2006, 2012), which is used as a workhorse to
study self-control problems. The condition that is known from the literature
on such games, continuity at infinity, turns out to be stronger than our
assumptions.
In retrospect, it is natural that the discussion of the one-shot deviation
principle leads to topological concepts in large games. This is precisely the
class of games where there is in general no “last decision” for a given player.
Hence, it becomes necessary to, explicitly or implicitly, consider behavior “in
the limit.” Indeed, limits are, in themselves, topological concepts.
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